There are several ways to exploit LogoFAIL. Remote attacks work by first exploiting an unpatched vulnerability in a browser, media player, or other app and using the administrative control gained to replace the legitimate logo image processed early in the boot process with an identical-looking one that exploits a parser flaw. The other way is to gain brief access to a vulnerable device while it’s unlocked and replace the legitimate image file with a malicious one.
In short, the adversary requires elevated access to replace a file on the EFI partition. In this case, you should consider the machine compromised with or without this flaw.
You weren’t hoping that Secure Boot saves your ass, were you?
True, but this was the case without this finding, wasn’t it? With write access to the EFI you could replace the boot loader and do whatever you please.
In many of these cases, however, it’s still possible to run a software tool freely available from the IBV or device vendor website that reflashes the firmware from the OS. To pass security checks, the tool installs the same cryptographically signed UEFI firmware already in use, with only the logo image, which doesn’t require a valid digital signature, changed.
Doesn’t this mean that secure boot would save your ass? If you verify that the boot files are signed (secure boot) then you can’t boot these modified files or am I missing something?
Well, not an expert. We learned now that logos are not signed. I’m not sure the boot menu config file is not either. So on a typical linux setup you can inject a command there.
If it can execute in ram (as far as I understand, they’ve been talking about fileless attacks, so… Possible?), it can just inject whatever
Addit: also, sucure boot on most systems, well, sucks, unless you remove m$ keys and flash yours, at least. The thing is, they signed shim and whatever was the alternative chainable bootloader (mako or smth?) effectively rendering the whole thing useless; also there was a grub binary distributed as part of some kaspersky’s livecd-s with unlocked config, so, yet again, load whatever tf you want
Last time I enabled secure boot it was with a unified kernel image, there was nothing on the EFI partition that was unsigned.
Idk about the default shim setup but using dracut with uki, rolled keys and luks it’d be secure.
After this you’re protected from offline attacks only though, unless you sign the UKI on a different device any program with root could still sign the modified images itself but no one could do an Evil Maid Attack or similar.
The point with m$ keys was that you should delete them as they’re used to sign stuff that loads literally anything given your maid is insistent enough.
[note: it was mentioned in the arch wiki that sometimes removing m$ keys bricks some (which exactly wasn’t mentioned) devices]
Ah, so the next Air Bud movie will be what, Hack Bud?
“There’s nothing in the specifications that says that a dog can’t have admin access.”
“Nothing but 'net!”
In short, the adversary requires elevated access to replace a file on the EFI partition. In this case, you should consider the machine compromised with or without this flaw.
You weren’t hoping that Secure Boot saves your ass, were you?
Since the EFI partition is unencrypted, physical access would do the trick here too, even with every firmware/software security measure.
True, but this was the case without this finding, wasn’t it? With write access to the EFI you could replace the boot loader and do whatever you please.
Unless a proper secure boot + FDE setup is in place.
The idea is also that a compromised system will remains compromised after all storage drives are removed.
deleted by creator
The worst part it persists through reinstalls (if i understood correctly)
This is also my understanding, at least of you keep the EFI partition.
It can outlast those too.
Boy do I love the future.
It’s reminiscent of boot sector viruses in the DOS days.
Doesn’t this mean that secure boot would save your ass? If you verify that the boot files are signed (secure boot) then you can’t boot these modified files or am I missing something?
Well, not an expert. We learned now that logos are not signed. I’m not sure the boot menu config file is not either. So on a typical linux setup you can inject a command there.
If it can execute in ram (as far as I understand, they’ve been talking about fileless attacks, so… Possible?), it can just inject whatever
Addit: also, sucure boot on most systems, well, sucks, unless you remove m$ keys and flash yours, at least. The thing is, they signed shim and whatever was the alternative chainable bootloader (mako or smth?) effectively rendering the whole thing useless; also there was a grub binary distributed as part of some kaspersky’s livecd-s with unlocked config, so, yet again, load whatever tf you want
Last time I enabled secure boot it was with a unified kernel image, there was nothing on the EFI partition that was unsigned.
Idk about the default shim setup but using dracut with uki, rolled keys and luks it’d be secure.
After this you’re protected from offline attacks only though, unless you sign the UKI on a different device any program with root could still sign the modified images itself but no one could do an Evil Maid Attack or similar.
The point with m$ keys was that you should delete them as they’re used to sign stuff that loads literally anything given your maid is insistent enough.
[note: it was mentioned in the arch wiki that sometimes removing m$ keys bricks some (which exactly wasn’t mentioned) devices]
If I can replace a file in your EFI, how hard would it be to sign the same file.
Well, it rules out an evil maid attack and maybe jumping over a dual boot setup.
So if I have my computer set that it needs a sudo password for most changes am I good?
Yes, that’s my understanding. A normal user cannot do this. (And of course, an attacker shouldn’t not control a local user in the first place.)
Physical access is also a risk, but physical access trumps everything.
Thanks for the answer. Unless my dog learns how to code I think I’m safe from anyone getting physical access
As a hacker imma start teaching dogs to code as part of my breakin process, sorry bud
Introduce him or her to FidoNet.
Ah, so the next Air Bud movie will be what, Hack Bud?
“There’s nothing in the specifications that says that a dog can’t have admin access.”
“Nothing but 'net!”
Unless they find another way to escalate privileges… A bug, a random binary with suid, etc
See, I knew there were other reasons I wouldn’t touch secure boot lol
i wonder if containerized firefox (eg snap/flatpak) will
Yeah, if someone has write access to your boot partition then you’re kind of already screwed.